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Quantum key distribution performs the trick of growing a secret key in two distant places con-
nected by a quantum channel. The main reason is that the legitimate users can bound the infor-
mation gathered by the eavesdropper. In practical systems, whether because of finite resources or
external conditions, the quantum channel is subject to fluctuations. A rate adaptive information
reconciliation protocol, that adapts to the changes in the communication channel, is then required
to minimize the leakage of information in the classical postprocessing.
We consider here the leakage of a rate-adaptive information reconciliation protocol. The length of
the exchanged messages is larger than that of an optimal protocol; however, we prove that the min-
entropy reduction is limited. The simulation results, both on the asymptotic and in the finite-length
regime, show that this protocol allows to increase the amount of distillable secret key.
I. INTRODUCTION
Claude E. Shannon published his seminal “A mathe-
matical theory of communications” [1] in 1948 after eight
years of intermittent work [2]. The paper meant the
birth of communications and coding theory. Shannon
did not only establish the frame under which communi-
cations systems could be studied and compared, he also
proved their fundamental limits, i.e. the limiting rates
for data compression and reliable transmission through
noisy channels. This second result was specially surpris-
ing since there was no certainty that reliable transmission
with a positive rate was even possible [3].
A year later, in 1949, Shannon’s “Communication the-
ory of secrecy systems” [4] came to light. In words of
Robert Gallager “Shannon’s cryptography work can be
viewed as changing cryptography from an art to a sci-
ence” [2]. Shannon successfully applied the tools devel-
oped in [1] to the problem of transmitting confidential
messages through public channels. His main conclusion
is that a message from a set of messages sent through a
public channel can be obfuscated into a cypher-text with
the help of a secret key in such a way that the number
of possible originating messages is the whole set of mes-
sages, that is, the cypher-text leaks no information to a
possible eavesdropper. The condition for this to happen
is that the number of secret keys is equal or greater than
the number of messages. This condition only applies to
eavesdroppers with unbounded resources, if we limit the
storage or computing capability of the eavesdropper se-
cret communications are possible without fulfilling the
condition. It is evident that computing power resources
that today might be considered as out of reach might be-
come available in the near future. There is an implicit
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risk in assuming that an eavesdropper is limited in any
way beyond the fundamental limits that physics impose
her, therefore the interest in establishing the scenarios in
which some kind of security can be achieved without any
assumption is self-evident.
The distribution of secret keys or SKD is a prob-
lem closely related to confidential communications. Two
parties sharing a secret key can communicate privately
through a channel in the conditions discussed in the pre-
vious paragraph. We can then study the problem of se-
cret key sharing as a way to achieve confidential com-
munications. The main idea is that two distant parties
can agree in a secret key if they have access to a shared
source of randomness. The randomness source can take
many incarnations, e.g. in the form of a source received
from a trusted party or in the form of a noisy channel [5].
In most of the SKD scenarios the legitimate parties
obtain instances of correlated sources which means that
they obtain similar but not identical strings. It is then
assumed that there is an authentic though otherwise pub-
lic channel available to all parties—including the eaves-
dropper. The legitimate parties can exchange additional
information through this channel in order to reconcile
their strings. They can do so by revealing some infor-
mation about them, for instance the parities of carefully
chosen positions. This process is known as information
reconciliation [6]. It is not hard to see that the informa-
tion exchanged through the public channel reduces the
uncertainty that the eavesdropper has on the strings of
the legitimate parties. Thus, a reduction in the leakage
due to information reconciliation allows to increase the
amount of distillable secret key. A second step known
as privacy amplification is then needed [7]. In the pri-
vacy amplification step the legitimate parties agree on a
secret but shorter key of which the eavesdropper has a
negligible amount of information.
These mathematical models can have a real, i.e. phys-
ical correspondence. One such a model is a physical
fiber carrying single photons randomly polarized in one
2of two non-orthogonal basis [8]. Quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) is probably the main practical application of
SKD. In a QKD protocol [8–10], two legitimate parties,
Alice and Bob, aim at sharing an information theoretic
secret key, even in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve.
In the quantum part of such a protocol, Alice and Bob ex-
change quantum signals, e.g. single photons, which carry
classical information. For instance, Alice encodes a clas-
sical bit onto the polarization or the phase of a photon
and sends this photon to Bob who measures it. In any
realistic implementation of a QKD protocol, the strings
obtained after the exchange of the quantum signals suf-
fer discrepancies mainly due to losses in the channel and
noise in Bob’s detectors but which are conservatively at-
tributed to the action of an eavesdropper. Therefore, any
QKD protocol must include the classical post-processing
steps described above in order to extract a secret key
from the correlated strings.
The channel connecting Alice and Bob in a real sys-
tem may substantially vary over time. The motivation of
this work is to analyze the sp-protocol [11], an informa-
tion reconciliation protocol that adapts to this channel
variations. We had previously showed that in a classi-
cal repetition scenario (i.e. with classical attackers and
independent, identically distributed sources) its reconcil-
iation efficiency is only limited by the quality of the er-
ror correcting code used to implement the protocol [12].
We consider here the leakage of the sp-protocol with a
quantum eavesdropper, both in the asymptotic and in
the finite-length regime, and its impact on the amount of
distillable secret key.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
Let X be a discrete random variable taking values in
the finite alphabet X . The Shannon entropy [1], min-
entropy and max-entropy [13] of X are respectively de-
fined by:
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
pX(x) log pX(x) (1)
H∞(X) = min
x∈X
(− log pX(x)) (2)
H0(X) = log |x ∈ X : pX(x) > 0| (3)
where | · | stands for the cardinality of a set. Logarithms
in Eq. (1) to (3) and throughout the text are taken base
two. It holds that H∞(X) ≤ H(X) ≤ H0(X), and the
equality occurs when the outcomes in X are given by a
uniform distribution.
Now let X and Y be two jointly distributed discrete
random variables taking values on alphabets X and Y,
respectively. The conditional entropy, min-entropy and
max-entropy of X given Y is defined by:
H(X |Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
H(X |y) (4)
H∞(X |Y ) = min
y∈Y
H∞(X |y) (5)
H0(X |Y ) = max
y∈Y
H0(X |y) (6)
where the entropy of a random variable given an event is
the entropy of the induced random variable.
Let the state of a finite dimensional quantum system
be represented by a trace one, positive semidefinite, op-
erator on a (finite dimensional) Hilbert space H. We
denote by P(H) the set of all states acting on H.
Let us give some basic definitions about the quantum
counterparts of these classical information measures. The
equivalent of the entropy of a random variable is the von
Neumann entropy of a state ρX [14]. It is defined as:
H(X)ρX = −tr(ρX log ρX) (7)
where tr denotes the trace operation and we indicate with
a subscript the state on which the entropy is computed.
Henceforth it will be explicitly written whenever it helps
clarifying a statement.
Let ρXY ∈ P(HX⊗HY ) be a bipartite quantum state.
The conditional quantum min-entropy of ρXY given HY
is defined as:
H∞(X |Y ) = sup
σY
(− logmin{λ|λ idX ⊗ σY ≥ ρXY }) (8)
where λ > 0.
If HY is one dimensional:
H∞(X |Y ) = H∞(X) = − logλmax(ρX) (9)
where λmax(ρX) outputs the maximum eigenvalue of ρX .
We finally consider the smooth generalization of the
conditional min-entropy introduced in [15]. Let {ρ, σ} ∈
P(H), the trace distance between ρ and σ is given by:
1
2
||ρ− σ||1 = tr (|ρ− σ|) (10)
The smooth entropy was first defined as an optimiza-
tion over all states ε-close in terms of the trace distance.
The smooth entropies have been redefined in terms of
other measures such as the purified distance and verify
additional properties [16, 17] but for the present study it
suffices to consider the original definition.
Let ρXY ∈ P(HX ⊗ HY ) and ε ≥ 0. The smooth
version of Eq. (8) is given by:
Hε∞(X |Y )ρXY = sup
ρˆXY
H∞(X |Y )ρˆXY (11)
where the supreme is found over all ρˆXY such that
1
2 ||ρXY − ρˆXY ||1 ≤ ε.
3III. INFORMATION RECONCILIATION
A. Impact of information reconciliation on the
secret key length
One common assumption in a SKD protocol is that all
the parties have access to the outcomes of an independent
identically distributed experiment repeated many times.
If this assumption holds the parties can safely regard an
average behavior as the law of large numbers guarantees
that the joint outcome will be typical with high probabil-
ity. However, assuming a repetition scenario might be un-
realistic in some situations, in these cases key distillation
can be considered for a finite number of outcomes of a
joint experiment. This second, more restrictive, scenario
is sometimes referred as finite-key distillation. Both the
repetition [10] and the finite-key [18–20] scenarios have
been addressed in QKD.
The secrecy of a key K can be measured in terms of
its closeness to a perfect one which is uniformly random
and decoupled from the eavesdropper’s system Z. A key
K is considered ε-secure if [21]:
1
2
||ρKZ − τK ⊗ ρZ ||1 ≤ ε (12)
The communications on the public channel might be
one-way or two-ways. We have chosen to restrict the
channel to one-way communications since our focus is on
practical protocols with reduced distillation complexity,
network requirements, etc. However, it should be noted
that two-way communications can be used to distill a
key in scenarios where one-way secret key distillation is
not possible [5] and, in general, the amount of distillable
secret key with two-way communications can be strictly
higher than with one-way communications [22, 23].
In the repetition scenario and aided with one-way clas-
sical communications, the maximum rate at which key
can be extracted with ε approaching zero as the number
of repetitions goes to infinity is given by [24]:
K = H(X |Z)−H(X |Y ) (13)
where X and Y are classical systems available to the
legitimate parties Alice and Bob and Z is a quantum
system at the eavesdropper’s site. The first term at the
rhs of Eq. (13) amounts to the randomness that can be
extracted which is independent of Z while the second
term can be regarded as the information that Alice and
Bob should exchange to reconcile X and Y .
Eq. (13) is valid only in the asymptotic case. However,
a real system has only access to finite resources, which
means that Alice and Bob not only have bounded compu-
tational power but also they have to distill a secret key
from a finite number of experiments. Thus, in general
there is no convergence toward an ideal key and security
has to be considered for an acceptable security threshold
ε.
Let us assume that Alice and Bob exchange N signals
out of which they use m for estimating their correlations
and t ≤ N −m for key distillation. If the correlations do
not verify some conditions Alice and Bob abort the pro-
tocol, εPE represents the probability that the parameter
estimation procedure fails.
Given some reconciliation protocol, C stands for the
set of all possible reconciliation messages and εEC rep-
resents the maximum probability that the estimate at
Bob’s site does not coincide with Alice’s string.
Let εPA represent the failure probability in the privacy
amplification procedure, and ε¯ be a smoothing param-
eter, then the rate at which the legitimate parties can
distill an ε-secure key is bounded by [25]:
Kε ≤
1
N
(
H ε¯∞(X
t|ZNC)− 2 log
1
εPA
)
(14)
where ε = nPEεPE+εEC+εPA+ε¯, and nPE is the number
of estimated parameters.
The smooth min-entropy in Eq. (14) can be evalu-
ated to measure the net impact of information recon-
ciliation [25]:
H ε¯∞(X
t|ZNC) ≥ H ε¯∞(X
t|ZN)− leak (15)
where leak is a purely classical term that tracks the
amount of information correlated with Xt revealed dur-
ing reconciliation. It is given by [15]:
leak = H0(C)−H∞(C|X
t) (16)
The main effect of an imperfect reconciliation is a re-
duction of the secret key rate, which in turn, in terms of
the figures of merit of a QKD protocol, limits the distance
range over which secret keys can be distilled [10, 26].
B. Fundamental limits of information reconciliation
Let Alice and Bob be two parties holding x and y,
two n-length strings that are respectively n outcomes of
two jointly distributed random variables X and Y . A
one-way reconciliation protocol on the strings x and y
is a protocol that produces the strings sx and sy from
x and y, respectively, after exchanging the message c(x)
through the public channel.
A reconciliation protocol is considered ε-robust [6] if:
∑
x∈Xn,y∈Yn
p(x, y)p(sx 6= sy) ≤ ε (17)
The efficiency of a reconciliation protocol can be mea-
sured using a quality parameter ξε that compares the
amount of disclosed information with the minimum the-
oretical disclosure:
4ξε =
leak
nH(X |Y )
(18)
the minimum nH(X |Y ) is known as the Slepian-Wolf
bound; it delimits the minimum rate for reliably describ-
ing a source X to a distant party with access to side
information Y [27].
It is well known the appropriateness of (linear) error
correcting codes for the Slepian-Wolf problem [28]. In
consequence, good error correcting codes can be used for
information reconciliation. Let C(n, k) be a linear code
with coding rate R0 = k/n, a message of length n − k
called the syndrome [29] can be used to reconcile two
sources with conditional entropy nH(X |Y ). Even if n−k
is greater than the theoretical minimum, for finite lengths
there is always non-zero error probability. We denote the
rate of decoding errors or frame error rate (FER) by the
parameter ε. Then, a reconciliation protocol based on
sending the syndrome of a linear code is ε-robust, and
the reconciliation efficiency is given by:
ξεC =
n− k
nH(X |Y )
=
1−R0
H(X |Y )
(19)
However, an acceptable FER in a communications pro-
tocol might not be sufficient in a security context. It is a
common practice to divide the reconciliation process into
two steps [18, 30]. In the first one, a common string is
produced, for instance using an error correcting code as
we just described. In the second one, Alice uniformly at
random chooses a function f from a family of 2-universal
hash functions [31] and computes a hash of her string
f(sx). Alice sends to Bob her choice f together with
f(sx). Bob computes his own hash value f(sy) and the
protocol aborts if f(sx) 6= f(sy). Since the choice of the
hash function is independent of X , only the length of
the hash ⌈− log εEC⌉ for some εEC > 0 is added to the
leakage:
leakεECC = n(1−R0) + ⌈log
1
εEC
⌉ (20)
The joint reconciliation process is εEC-robust where
εEC can be chosen to be much smaller than the FER.
It is clear from Eq. (19) that the length of the conver-
sation when using a code is fixed to n − k. That is, the
amount of information does not adapt to the error rate
in the channel. This is a perfect solution for the Slepian-
Wolf problem since the correlations are fixed and known
beforehand. However, in QKD it is common that the
error rate varies from one execution to the next. In con-
sequence, an adaptation of the coding rate is needed in
order to use linear codes for reconciliation.
IV. STUDY OF A RATE-ADAPTIVE
PROTOCOL
In this section we study the efficiency and impact
of a rate-adaptive protocol, which is in essence the sp-
protocol in [11] with an additional error verification step.
A. Description of the rate-adaptive protocol
In the following we detail the steps of a rate-adaptive
information reconciliation protocol.
Step 0: Pre-conditions. Alice and Bob agree on the fol-
lowing parameters: (i) a pool of shared mother codes of
length n, constructed for different rates; (ii) d the maxi-
mum number of symbols (bits) that will be used to adapt
the coding rate, and (iii) the target εEC which character-
izes the length of the hashes.
Step 1: Raw key exchange. Alice and Bob obtain two
correlated strings x and y, respectively, of length n − d
and a precise estimate of the error rate pe. If pe is outside
their target rates they abort the protocol. Otherwise,
both parties select the appropriate code C and compute
the adequate number of symbols (bits) s to reveal, with
s < d, such that the coding rate is then adapted to pe.
Step 2: Coding. Alice creates a extended string xˆ of
length n by concatenating x and x′, a uniformly random
string of length d. Alice sends to Bob the hash value f(xˆ),
the syndrome of xˆ on C and the values and positions of
s symbols among the d symbols randomly generated.
Step 3: Decoding. Bob creates a extended string of
length n by concatenating y and y′, a uniformly random
string of length d. Bob sets the values of the received
s symbols to their correct value. Bob computes yˆ his
estimate of xˆ and f(yˆ) his own hash value. If f(yˆ) 6= f(xˆ)
they abort the protocol.
We would like to remark that in Step 2 both the ver-
ification tag and the reconciliation message are jointly
encoded and sent to Bob. There is no extra interactivity
coming from error verification, still only one message is
exchanged for reconciliation and a second one from Bob
to Alice is sent to notify the success or failure of the
protocol.
B. Leakage
The sp-protocol creates an extended system XtX ′
by adding d symbols (bits) with random values. The
Slepian-Wolf bound implies that for successful reconcili-
ation the length of the reconciliation message should be
greater than:
H(XtX ′|Y t) = H(Xt|Y t) + d (21)
which is trivially larger than H(Xt|Y t) if d > 0.
5However, the appropriate comparison is in terms of
the conditional smooth entropy on the reconciled sys-
tem, since it is the magnitude that limits the distillable
key after the reconciliation step. Lemma 1 shows that
the smooth min-entropy decrease produced by the sp-
protocol on the extended system is equivalent to the de-
crease produced by an error correcting code with rate R
on the original system. This equivalent coding rate R is
given by:
R =
k − s
n− d
(22)
The dependence of R on d and s allows to understand
how the protocol adapts the amount of information dis-
closed for reconciling errors. Since the value of d is fixed
previous to the execution of the protocol, it is s, the num-
ber of symbols (bits) revealed to Bob on the public chan-
nel, the parameter available to Alice for modulating the
coding rate. A higher value of s increases the informa-
tion available to the decoder allowing to reconcile noisier
strings, while a lower value of s allows to reduce the leak-
age by increasing the coding rate. On the other hand, d
sets the range of achievable rates, from (k−d)/(n−d) to
k/(n− d). The extremal values correspond to the limit-
ing cases of revealing the d symbols (bits) and revealing
no information on the public channel.
Lemma 1. Let ρXtZN be a bipartite state and σXtX′ZNC
the extension resulting from the application of the sp-
protocol. Then the smooth min-entropy of the extended
system XtX ′ given ZNC can be bounded by:
Hε∞(X
tX ′|ZNC)σ ≥ H
ε
∞(X
t|Z)ρ− t(1−R)−⌈log
1
εEC
⌉
Proof.
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X
tX ′|ZNC)σ ≥ H
ε+ε′
∞ (X
tX ′|ZN)σ − leak
= Hε+ε
′
∞ (X
tX ′|ZNI)φ − leak
≥ Hε∞(X
t|ZN )φ +H
ε′
∞(X
′|I)φ
−leak
Let ε′ ≥ 0. The first inequality follows from Eq. (15)
that bounds the impact of the conversation. We can
trivially extend the state on σXtX′ZN to φXtX′ZNI =
σXtX′ZN ⊗ idI , where I is a one dimensional system,
without changing the value of the smooth min-entropy
(Hε+ε
′
∞ (X
tX ′|ZN)σ = H
ε+ε′
∞ (X
tX ′|ZNI)φ); the first
equality holds by this argument. We can apply Renner’s
superadditivity theorem in [15] for product states to ob-
tain the second inequality. If we now consider just the
second and third terms from this last relation we obtain:
Hε
′
∞(X
′|I)φ − leak = (s+ p)
−
(
s+ n(1−R0) + ⌈log
1
εEC
⌉
)
= −t(1−R)− ⌈log
1
εEC
⌉
We can choose ε′ = 0 and since I is one-dimensional
H∞(X
′|I)φ reduces to H∞(X
′)φ. Furthermore, X
′ is
classical and uniformly distributed thus maximizing the
min-entropy. The leakage is obtained by tracking the
amount of information sent from Alice to Bob during the
protocol and subtracting the part that is independent
from XtX ′.
We recover the desired result if we consider that
φXtX′ZN I is also an extension of ρXtZN which means
that Hε∞(X
t|ZN)φ = H
ε
∞(X
t|ZN)ρ.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we compare the tradeoffs between us-
ing the sp-protocol, non-adapted error correcting codes
and Cascade (a well-known interactive protocol proposed
in [6] and implemented in most QKD systems). First we
present the difference of the reconciliation protocols in
terms of asymptotic leakage and then we plug them in
a QKD protocol and compare the distillable secret key
with finite resources.
The strings are assumed to be binary and are modeled
as the input and output of a binary symmetric channel
(BSC). This is appropriate in the case of some QKD pro-
tocols [8, 32, 33] if errors on the quantum channel are
symmetric and independent.
For convenience, we have implemented the rate adap-
tive sp-protocol with irregular binary low-density parity-
check (LDPC) codes since there is a wealth of material
and information available: a number of matrices, decod-
ing algorithms and communication standards have been
proposed in the last years for these codes. However, non-
binary LDPC codes [34] or other code families [35], could
probably be adapted to implement the sp-protocol. We
fixed the proportion of modulated symbols to d/n = 5%.
Fig. 1 shows the leakage rate (leakεECC /t) as a function
of the QBER. An optimal protocol achieving the Slepian-
Wolf bound (solid line) is compared to the asymptotic
sp-protocol computed using the theoretical analysis de-
scribed in the Appendix B (dashed line) and to Cascade
(dotted line). Note that for Cascade, instead of upper
bounding the leakage with the analytical estimate given
in [6] which might be overly pessimistic, we used as up-
per bound the leakage rate with large blocks of length
106 (see Appendix A for numerical justification).
Both Cascade and the sp-protocol are close to optimal
for small QBERs. However, approximately over 3% they
begin to diverge and while the former follows closely the
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FIG. 1. The asymptotic leakage of the sp-protocol, the leak-
age of Cascade and the leakage for a perfect reconciliation
procedure are compared as a a function of the QBER.
Slepian-Wolf bound the latter clearly has a higher leak-
age.
To analyze the impact of reconciliation on the achiev-
able secret key rate, we have chosen the prepare and mea-
sure version of BB84 and consider for simplicity and in
order to highlight the effect of reconciliation, an idealized
scenario: we assume that Alice and Bob have access to
single photon sources and perfect detectors. Following
[36] the secret key in this setting can be distilled at a
rate:
Kε ≤
t
N
((1− h(Q))−∆(t)− leak/t) (23)
where h is the binary entropy function, Q is the estimated
QBER that takes into account statistical fluctuations due
to the finite length case, and ∆ is the smoothing param-
eter that allows to lower bound the smooth min-entropy
in Eq. (14) [25].
Fig. 2 shows the secret key rate as a function of the
number of exchanged signals (N). We compare in this
figure the secret key rate for three different QBER values
(4%, 5% and 6%) using a perfect reconciliation protocol,
Cascade, and the sp-protocol. The security parameter ε
is set to 10−5, and εEC = 10
−10, as suggested in [36].
The convergence of LDPC codes towards the asymp-
totic value is slower than that of Cascade (see Appendix
A). In consequence the optimality of the distillable key
with this implementation of the sp-protocol increases
with the length: shifting from close to Cascade for small
lengths to close to the optimal value asymptotically. For
low QBERs and small lengths, the slow convergence of
LDPC codes together with the good efficiency of Cascade
in this region make both secret key rates very similar.
For higher QBERs, even for small lengths the LDPC im-
plementation of the sp-protocol clearly outperforms Cas-
cade.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Secret key rate in the finite-key
regime for a perfect reconciliation procedure, the sp-protocol,
and considering the efficiency of Cascade. Three different
QBER values are considered (from left to right): 4% (blue),
5% (green) and 6% (red). Other parameters: ε = 10−5,
εEC = 10
−10.
VI. DISCUSSION
This paper analyzes some improvements in the classical
post-processing of QKD protocols. The key distillation
process can be divided in two steps: information recon-
ciliation and privacy amplification. Information reconcil-
iation allows to establish a common string while in the
privacy amplification step a shorter but more secure key
is created. Both steps are highly coupled: in essence ev-
ery bit exchanged in the information reconciliation step
implies that one additional bit has to be removed of the
final key in the privacy amplification step.
The problem of correcting the discrepancies between
the strings of the legitimate parties is also known as the
problem of source coding with side information by the
information theory community. Under this paradigm, the
theoretical limits of information reconciliation are given
by the Slepian-Wolf bound. Information reconciliation
is, then, basically error correction.
We have adopted a pragmatic approach towards er-
ror correction and used modern coding techniques well
suited for QKD purposes. In a real QKD scenario we
have to deal with a broad range of error rates. Further,
the number of accesses to the classical public communica-
tion channel should be limited. As opposed to the eaves-
dropper that should, for the sake of security, be assumed
to have access to unbounded resources, the legitimate
parties are equipped with a finite amount of resources.
The sp-protocol, induced by a mother code of rate R0
allows the legitimate parties to adapt the reconciliation
step to varying conditions. However, it exchanges a mes-
sage longer than the optimal one. We proved that the
sp-protocol is equivalent to the use of a code with an
adapted rate R. The claim holds in the sense that the
7smooth min-entropy reduction of the former in an ex-
tended system is bounded by the reduction of the latter
in the original system.
We implemented the sp-protocol with irregular LDPC
codes. The results obtained indicate that the sp-protocol
asymptotically behaves close to the theoretical limit. We
claim no optimality in our implementation of the sp-
protocol and certainly it could be expected that other
code families are better suited to short key lengths or
to other kind of correlations different than those mod-
eled by a BSC. The analysis, however, applies to any
linear error correcting code. In consequence, it allows
to consider rate-adaptive information reconciliation as a
specific code design problem. We believe that this pro-
tocol opens the doors to consider simpler and possibly
better schemes for the classical postprocessing in secret
key distillation protocols.
Appendix A: Cascade simulations
In order to estimate the asymptotic leakage of Cascade
we simulated the protocol with strings of length 104, 105
and 106. The results on Table I show that with a string
length of 106 the leakage rate has already converged.
QBER 104 105 106
0.01 0.0917 0.0914 0.0914
0.04 0.285 0.284 0.284
0.05 0.338 0.338 0.338
0.06 0.390 0.390 0.390
TABLE I. This table shows the leakage rate of Cascade for
strings of length 104, 105 and 106 as a function of the QBER.
Appendix B: Theoretical analysis of rate modulated
codes
Binary linear codes admit a bipartite graph representa-
tion in which symbols are linked with parity checks. An
ensemble of irregular binary LDPC codes can be defined
by the degree distributions on the edges of symbols and
checks [37]. We can study the behavior of an ensemble
under a message passing algorithm by tracking the evolu-
tion of the message distributions. This recursive tracking
is known as density evolution [37] and allows to compute
the asymptotic decoding threshold of a code family on
a communications channel. In general, densities are up-
dated following this recurrence relation:
pℓ+1(x) = ρ
(
p0(x) ∗ λ
(
pℓ(x)
))
(B1)
where pℓ is the average probability on symbols on the
decoding iteration ℓ if the code graph is tree like, λ(x) and
ρ(x) are the symbol and check node degree polynomials
respectively, p0(x) is the initial message density, and ∗
stands for convolution.
In section V, we focused our attention in the BSC.
This channel is characterized by a single parameter: the
crossover probability ε. That is, a bit is either noiselessly
transmitted with probability 1− ε or flipped with prob-
ability ε. The channel is then modeled by the following
initial density distribution:
p0(x) = ε∆L(ε)(x) + (1− ε)∆−L(ε)(x) (B2)
where L(ε) = log ε1−ε is a log-likelihood ratio, and
∆t(x) = δ(x − t) is the Dirac delta function displaced
at position t.
Now, in the sp-protocol, an n-length raw string is com-
posed of n− d bits sent through a noisy channel, in this
case the above described BSC, and d bits with randomly
assigned values out of which s are revealed through the
public and noiseless channel. Let σ and π, stand for the
fraction of bits that are completely known and unknown
to the decoder, respectively, we can compute the asymp-
totic behavior of the sp-protocol with the following initial
density:
p0(x) = (1− π − σ)
[
ε∆L(ε)(x) + (1− ε)∆−L(ε)(x)
]
+π∆0(x) + σ∆∞(x) (B3)
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